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T
he  interactions  among  trade,  international  migration,  and  economic 
development  in  migrant-sending  areas  are  complex,  and  paradoxes 
abound. This paper summarizes global trends in world migration and 
remittances,  discusses  some  paradoxes  surrounding  the  trade–migration–
development relationship, and reports findings from new research on Mexico-
to-U.S. migration, using data from rural Mexico. It concludes with some thoughts 
about designing policies to raise the development potential of remittances in 
migrant-sending areas. 
Trends in International Migration and Remittances
The international migration of labor is critical to how globalization and eco-
nomic development are experienced by many less developed countries (LDCs). 
The number of international migrants, or people residing in a country other than 
their country of birth, has increased more or less linearly over the past forty years, 
from an estimated 76 million in 1965 to 188 million in 2005, as illustrated in Fig-
ure 1. About one half of the world’s international migrants are women. However, 
some international migrant flows are dominated by males, others by females. For 
example, more men than women immigrate to the United States from India and 
El Salvador, but U.S. immigration from China and South Korea is dominated by fe-200  J. Edward Taylor
males. The differences in international migration between the genders are just now 
becoming a focus of international migration research.
International  migration  creates  both  losses  and  gains  for  the  LDCs  from 
which international migrants originate. LDCs lose millions of highly educated 
people where human capital often is already scarce (e.g., see Özden and Schiff 
2005). LDCs also lose significant numbers of relatively low-skilled workers whose 
productivity and wages are far higher abroad than at home. 
International migrants send substantial amounts of remittances back to their 
countries of origin. The flow of international migrant remittances has increased more 
rapidly than the number of international migrants themselves: from an estimated 
US$2 billion in 1970 to US$216 billion in 2004.1 While the growth in international 
migration has been linear, the growth in remittances has been nonlinear, as one 
can see in Figure 2. In other words, on average, each of the world’s international 
migrants is sending home more remittances today than in the past. There is not a 
single convincing explanation for this phenomenon. Nearly 70 percent of all remit-
tances go to LDCs. It is likely that remittance figures understate true international 
remittance flows, which include an unknown amount of cash that does not enter 
countries through formal banking channels as well as goods that migrants send or 
carry home. There is evidence, however, that more migrants are using formal chan-
nels to remit today than in the past.
Figure 1
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Remittances make people the most important “export” of many LDCs in terms 
of the foreign exchange they generate. In 2004, remittances were equivalent to 78 
percent of the total value of exports in El Salvador and 108 percent in Nicaragua. 
International migrant remittances are also an increasing share of national income 
in many countries. For example, in 2004, remittances represented 11 percent of 
the gross domestic product of Guatemala, more than double the share in 2001. 
In the same year, remittances constituted 16 percent of the total GDP of El Sal-
vador. 
There is little information on where, within countries, international migration 
originates and remittances flow. Data from the limited number of national and 
regional surveys that include migration reveal that both migration and remittances 
are concentrated within, as well as among, LDCs. This means that international 
migration affects some countries and some regions within these countries more 
than others.
International Migration and Development Puzzles  
and Paradoxes
Recent  economic  studies  suggest  that  migration  and  development—and 
thus, trade integration affecting development—are closely linked to one another.           
Figure 2



























































SOURCE: International Monetary Fund (2005).202  J. Edward Taylor
Development shapes migration, and migration, in turn, influences development, 
sometimes in ways that are surprising and not recognized by researchers and 
policymakers.2 Paradoxes and puzzles abound. 
Does Migration Affect Development or the Reverse?
A big problem for researchers trying to test whether migration affects devel-
opment is that underdevelopment also drives emigration. One usually does not 
see streams of migrants leaving economies that are dynamic centers of employ-
ment. If migration and underdevelopment seem to go hand in hand, it might 
be because the loss of people to migration retards development, as pessimistic 
studies of migration and development assert (and new research findings contest). 
Or it might be that people migrate away from underdeveloped areas, which have 
little to offer them if they stay. Naturally, both may be true; the question is which 
dominates. It is difficult to separate cause from effect. 
Do Higher Incomes Mean Less Emigration?
Low incomes create an incentive for people to emigrate, but paradoxically, 
there are many cases where both incomes and international migration are in-
creasing in poor regions of LDCs. Usually it is not the poorest households that 
send migrants abroad. The very poorest households have an incentive to send 
migrants abroad and reap the reward of remittance income that is higher than 
what family members could earn at home. However, international migration is 
costly and risky, and the poorest households often cannot afford the costs and 
risks. At the other extreme, relatively well-off households in poor regions have 
the liquidity to pay the international migration bill and are often more willing to 
assume risks (or else have ways to insure themselves against risks). However, 
while they are more likely to have the means to migrate abroad, they are less 
likely to have the will. As a result, in poor areas of LDCs, international migrants 
tend to come from the upper-middle part of the income distribution, not from the 
poorest households. This raises some questions about the effectiveness of remit-
tances at reducing poverty.
When There Is No Brain Drain (and Maybe a Brain Gain)
The loss of human capital to international migration, commonly known as 
the brain drain, is well documented.3 If individuals who migrate abroad are more 
skilled and highly educated than those who stay behind, productivity and in-
comes in migrant-sending areas can fall. Some research suggests that the op-
posite may be true. In some cases, migration creates a brain gain instead of a 
brain drain. One study found evidence that the migration of highly educated 
individuals from developing countries has had a positive impact on aggregate 
human capital formation in those countries. This is because the possibility of 203  The Relationship Between International Migration, Trade, and Development
someday migrating abroad induces children to go to school. Another study found 
that internal migration by relatively skilled villagers in Mexico raised, rather than 
depleted, average schooling levels in villages. No study of the dizzying growth 
of India’s information technology industry would be complete without mention-
ing migration connections with Silicon Valley and the incentives they create for 
Indian youth to go to school.4
International migration does not always select the most educated, however. 
In theory, more highly educated people should take their schooling to wherever 
its economic returns are highest. For a Mexican villager with above-average edu-
cation (i.e., seven or more years of completed schooling), this is not likely to be in 
the United States. It is more likely to be at an internal migrant destination. Studies 
find that education does not stimulate international migration from rural Mexico, 
but it significantly increases the likelihood of internal migration.
A Self-Perpetuating Process
By far the most important variable driving international migration is migration 
networks, or contacts with family members and perhaps also with neighbors who 
have previously migrated. “Pioneer” migrants send home not only remittances 
but also information about how to migrate, where to look for work, which labor 
recruiters or smugglers to trust, what wages to expect, and how to overcome 
migration costs and risks. Past migrants also may support new migrants at their 
destination. They may even be willing to help finance the migration costs and 
insure against the risks. 
The value of networks depends on where they go; networks can negatively 
affect migration to destinations to which they do not lead. It also depends on 
gender. Recent findings suggest that the value of networks may be higher for 
women than for men because female migrants appear to be more deterred by 
risky border crossings, uncertain prospects abroad, and concerns for personal 
safety.5 Research also suggests that the benefits created by networks are not lim-
ited to just those households that have already sent family members abroad: Ac-
cess to networks eventually spreads to benefit other households. For example, 
the more households in a village that have migrants, the more likely it is that 
other households in the village eventually will send migrants abroad.6 Networks 
with international labor recruiters play an important role in shaping international 
migration from some, but not all, LDCs. 
Regional Trade Integration and International Migration
It is many LDCs’ hope that new trade opportunities will stimulate income 
and employment at home. One would think that this might deter emigration, but 
history suggests that often this is not the case in the short run. The final report of 
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Development concluded that “expanded trade between the sending countries and 
the United States is the single most important remedy” for unwanted migration (U.S. 
Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic 
Development 1990). That is, in the long run, trade and migration are substitutes. 
However, the Commission also warned that “the economic development process 
itself tends in the short to medium term to stimulate migration.” It concluded that 
the same policies that accelerate economic growth—including privatization, land 
reform, and freer trade—temporarily increase migration pressures because of the 
displacement and disruptions that accompany development. The fact that trade 
and migration may be complements in the short run may create a short-run ver-
sus long-run dilemma for countries concerned about migration (Martin 1993).
Emigration may increase in the short run if trade reforms spur imports that 
compete with labor-intensive production. In the long run, if export activities 
expand and remittances create income and investment multipliers, emigration 
pressures may subside.7 
There is empirical evidence that economic growth is accompanied by tempo-
rary increases in emigration. The 48 million people who emigrated from Europe 
between 1850 and 1925 represented about one-eighth of Europe’s 1900 popula-
tion, suggesting that “large scale emigration was quite common during Europe’s 
period of industrialization” (Massey 1991). When southern European nations such 
as Italy and Spain industrialized and were integrated into the European Commu-
nity (EC, today the European Union, or EU), they, too, experienced significant 
emigration pressures. However, these countries had to wait six to ten years before 
their citizens were permitted to search freely for jobs in other EC countries. In the 
meantime, economic gaps narrowed enough that once Italians and Spaniards had 
the right to work elsewhere in the EC, few did.8
In Asia, South Korea has experienced one of the world’s fastest migration 
transitions in the context of its export-led economic growth. In 1982 alone, more 
than 200,000 Korean workers emigrated. Korea sent 25 percent more immigrants 
to the United States during the 1980s than it did during the 1970s, despite rapid 
economic growth at home.9 By 1994, the South Korean government was debating 
how to deal with its immigration problems, including 20,000 legal foreign “train-
ees” and 50,000 to 100,000 illegal alien workers. 
The most comprehensive data on international migration over time are from 
the 2003 Mexico National Rural Household Survey. This survey compiled retro-
spective migration histories for all family members (regardless of whether they 
were present at the time of the survey) from a nationally representative sample of 
rural households between 1980 and 2002. With this information it is possible to 
reconstruct migration trends from rural Mexico over a period spanning years both 
before and after the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) in 1994. These trends are illustrated in Figure 3. There is no obvious 20  The Relationship Between International Migration, Trade, and Development
break in the migration trend after 1994, only a continuation of an upward trend 
that started years earlier. When we use a dynamic econometric model to test for a 
NAFTA effect, we find that this effect is small or insignificant. There is some evi-
dence that NAFTA had a slightly negative effect on male migration and a positive 
effect on migration to U.S. farm jobs, but no clear influence one way or another 
on total migration from rural Mexico to the United States.10
The Ambiguous Effects (and Gender Bias) of Immigration Policies
The effects of immigration reforms and border enforcement on immigration 
are almost always ambiguous. Only an empirical analysis can tell us whether the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) increased or decreased the prob-
ability of migration from, say, Mexico to the United States, or whether heightened 
border enforcement has increased or decreased the number of unauthorized im-
migrants in the U.S. In the case of IRCA, there is now strong evidence that the 
legalization effect (a positive for immigration) dominated the employer sanctions 
effect (a negative for immigration). The intent of increased border enforcement is 
to deter new unauthorized immigration. However, border enforcement also may 
deter return migration.
Our analysis of migration from rural Mexico finds that IRCA did not sig-
nificantly affect overall migration and may have increased migration to U.S. farm 
Figure 3


































































SOURCE: Mexico National Rural Household Survey.20  J. Edward Taylor
jobs. It also finds that U.S. expenditures on border enforcement have not reduced 
the probability of Mexico-to-U.S. migration, and they may have increased it. 
The Alternative to International Migration Generally Is Not to Stay at Home
One often hears of investing scarce resources (including remittances) in stay-
at-home development of rural areas. Yet the alternative to international migration 
usually is not staying at home—it is migrating somewhere else. Figure 4 illustrates 
that as per capita incomes increase, the share of the workforce in agriculture not 
only goes down—it plummets. In 2004, in Burundi, Burkina Faso, Niger, Malawi, 
and Rwanda, with a per capita income (PPP adjusted) of US$620 to $1,230, 90 
percent or more of the national workforce was in agriculture.11 Between 79 per-
cent and 94 percent of the population lived in rural areas. China, at $4,980 per 
capita PPP, had 49 percent in farm jobs and 63 percent living in rural areas, and 
these percentages were falling fast. Rich countries typically have less than 5 per-
cent of their workforce in agriculture and 25 percent or less of their populations 
living in rural areas. Remarkably, per capita income alone can explain 85 percent 
of the variation in the percentages of country workforces in agriculture. 
Enormous differences in rural development policies seem to have little ef-
fect on whether people stay in agriculture or not. Economic mobility requires 
Figure 4













0 $10,000 $20,000 $30,000 $40,000













































SOURCES: World Bank, http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline; The World Factbook 2005, www.cia.gov/cia/
publications/factbook/fields/2048.html.20  The Relationship Between International Migration, Trade, and Development
geographic mobility, and for most farmers and their children, the question is not 
whether to migrate but where. It is instructive to look at some of the world’s 
rural development success stories. China, where agriculture production has ris-
en sharply and international migration is generally not an option for the rural 
population, is one. Between 1990 and 2004, the percentage of China’s workforce 
employed in farm jobs plunged from 72 percent to 49 percent. Chile, despite its 
famous agricultural export boom, saw the share of its agricultural workforce fall 
from 19 percent to 14 percent.
  In Japan and France, despite expensive agricultural support programs, 
agriculture’s share of the workforce today is 5 percent and 4 percent, respectively. 
In the United States, where farm support programs are legendary and the ques-
tion of emigration is academic (but immigration is huge), less than 2 percent of 
the workforce is in agriculture (nearly all of the farm workforce is foreign-born), 
and 23 percent of the population is rural (this includes many high-income people 
for whom rural living is an amenity and the Internet transforms rural homes into 
offices). In the U.K., 2 percent of the workforce is in agriculture and 11 percent 
of the population lives in rural areas.
Many or Most of Migrations’ Impacts Are Not in the Migrant-Sending  
Households
Migration transforms the economies of the households that send migrants 
abroad and receive remittances from them. Studies find that the loss of labor 
to migration can discourage household production activities that require large 
amounts of labor, particularly where hired workers are not readily available. How-
ever, remittances can enable household to overcome credit and other constraints 
and invest in new production technologies and activities. There is evidence that 
when one controls for lost labor, the effects of remittances on production in mi-
grant-sending households are positive. As a result, the activities of households 
that send migrants abroad change.
This is illustrated in Figure 5. Households in a village in Michoacán, one of 
Mexico’s major migrant-sending states, were surveyed in 1983 and again in 1993. 
During the interim, migration from this village to the United States increased 
sharply, as did remittances. However, the average share of remittances in house-
hold incomes went down, from 45 percent in 1983 to 27 percent in 1993, because 
total income also increased. The principal income driver was livestock. The aver-
age share of livestock income in household total income rose from 23 percent 
to 42 percent. In this village, livestock was an ideal complement to international 
migration. Land for grazing was abundant in the hills surrounding the village, re-
mittances provided the financing households needed to invest in their herds, and 
livestock production uses little labor; in many cases, children tend the animals, 
while their older siblings migrate to destinations in Mexico or abroad.20  J. Edward Taylor
Despite  the  far-reaching  impact  migration  and  remittances  can  have  on 
households that send migrants, it appears that most of migration’s effects are 
found outside these households. When a migrant-sending household’s income 
increases as a result of remittances and the activities they stimulate, its spending 
also increases. New demand for goods and services, from bricklayers to butchers, 
is created inside and outside the village, and income in the households that offer 
these services increases. They, in turn, spend their new income, creating addi-
tional rounds of income increases. The result is the creation of income multipliers 
inside and outside the rural economy, akin to the fiscal multipliers made famous 
by John Maynard Keynes’ seminal work. Economywide models are required to 
estimate the size of remittance multipliers. Findings from such models indicate 
that each additional dollar remitted increases Mexico’s GDP by between $2.69 
and $3.17, depending on which households in Mexico receive the remittance.12 
The Importance of Gender
International migration affects men and women differently. Since at least the 
1960s, the number of female international migrants has been nearly as large as the 
number of male migrants. Today, the share of females in the world’s total interna-
tional migrant population is close to one half. However, some LDCs send more men 
than women abroad, while others send more women. Developed countries attract 
more men than women from some LDCs but more women than men from others. 
Recent research finds that both the determinants and impacts of international 
migration are different for women than for men. A new study from Mexico finds 
Figure 5
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that migration experience and networks raise the likelihood of international migra-
tion more for women than for men (Richter and Taylor 2006). It also finds that U.S. 
border enforcement expenditures decrease the likelihood of female migration, but 
they have no significant effect on male migration. More educated women (but not 
men) are more likely to migrate from rural Mexico to the United States. Male (but 
not female) migration may have been slightly lower after NAFTA.
Conclusions
Our brief discussion of trends and paradoxes of international migration leads 
us to the following conclusions: 
  •  Underdevelopment drives migration, but migration also affects under-
development.
  •  Income gaps between rich and poor countries create the incentives for 
international migration, but they are a necessary—not a sufficient—con-
dition. Most people do not migrate, even when incomes are far higher 
abroad than at home.
  •  Income growth in migrant-sending areas often is associated with more 
international migration, not less. In all countries that experience rapid 
income growth, the share of people in farm jobs and rural areas goes 
down.
  •  International migration is driven by networks. Once international migra-
tion from a particular region reaches a certain point, it tends to take on 
a life of its own.
  •  Half of the world’s international migrants are women, whose motives 
for migrating, constraints, concerns, and impacts on sending areas often 
are different from those of males.
 
These findings point to a rich set of potential policy implications. First, it is 
probably not a good idea to make “keeping people on the farm” a policy prior-
ity. This might seem controversial and provocative, but it is really common sense. 
History teaches us convincingly that trying to keep people at home is not only 
very costly, it is futile. Increased mobility is a concomitant part of economic suc-
cess: As per capita incomes grow, people leave the agricultural sector (they also 
move out of rural areas). Even in countries with the biggest rural development 
success stories, the share of the workforce in agriculture is decreasing. The coun-
tries that have been most successful at keeping population in rural areas have 
been precisely those that have been least successful at raising their people’s living 
standards and developing their agricultural base.210  J. Edward Taylor
This does not mean that governments should be passive or not try to promote 
development in migrant-sending areas, for at least two reasons. First, when low 
incomes are compounded by poor access to markets for inputs, outputs, credit, 
and insurance, there may be too much migration. Second, many of the world’s 
migrants come from rural areas, and it is now well known that in countries where 
agriculture is not growing, the rest of the economy usually does badly, too. How-
ever, occupational migration away from farm jobs and geographic migration from 
rural areas are, if anything, likely to be higher when incomes are growing. 
The challenge for policymakers is how to make migration a development 
tool and part of a dynamic process of income growth instead of a response to 
limited opportunities in migrant-sending areas. The ability of countries to create 
an environment that is conducive to broad-based economic growth generally 
can shape the economic landscape in migrant-sending areas, the contributions of 
migration to development, and the nonmigration options available to those who 
stay behind.
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1  Part of this sharp increase is probably due to an improved accounting of migrant remittances; 
however, the actual amount of remittances probably is higher than these numbers indicate, for 
reasons detailed below.
2  A few surveys are Massey et al. (1998), Taylor and Martin (2001), and Stark (1991).
3  For example, see the World Bank’s recent study (Özden and Schiff 2005). 
4  See Stark and Wang (2002); Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport (2001); and Boucher, Stark, and 
Taylor (2005). 
5  For example, see Richter and Taylor (2006) and Curran and Rivero-Fuentes (2003).
6  A number of studies show this, including Woodruff and Zenteno (2001) and McKenzie and 
Rapoport (2005).
7  See recent work on CAFTA and migration by Taylor and Yúnez-Naude (2006).
8  Straubhaar (1988) and Martin, Hönekopp, and Ulmann (1990). 
9  U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (1990), 50.
10 See Boucher et al. (2007) and Richter and Taylor (2006). It is not known whether the same can 
be said for emigration from urban Mexico to the United States because the data to do such an 
analysis are not available.
11 PPP refers to purchasing power parity. This is a better way to compare standards of living 
because it takes into account differences in the purchasing power of a given unit of income 
across countries. 
12 The remittance multiplier is larger for households that spend a larger share of their new income 
on locally produced goods and services with a low import content. See Taylor et al. (1996).211  The Relationship Between International Migration, Trade, and Development
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